The Treaty Problem: Understanding the Framers\u27 Approach to International Legal Commitments by Ford, Jade & Simmons, Mary Ella







C O M M E N T  
The Treaty Problem: Understanding the Framers’ 
Approach to International Legal Commitments 
introduction 
In 2014, when the Supreme Court decided Bond v. United States, it confronted 
an issue of structural federalism that had long vexed advocates of big and small 
government alike.
1
 The issue stemmed from the tension between the broad, ex-
clusive power the Constitution grants to the federal government to conclude in-
ternational treaties and the limitations that the Constitution places on Con-
gress’s domestic authority vis-à-vis the states.
2
 When these powers and 
limitations conflict, which should win out? How expansive should the federal 
government’s treaty power be? For both champions and critics of international 
law, the Court’s response in Bond
3
 left much to be desired. 
 
1. 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014). 
2. Id. at 2086-87. The Court had last addressed the tension between the scope of the treaty power 
and the Tenth Amendment in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). In Holland, the Court 
held that the Necessary and Proper Clause allowed Congress to enact legislation implement-
ing a treaty with Great Britain even though, in the absence of such a treaty, the legislation 
would have exceeded Congress’s Article I, Section 8 powers and infringed on powers reserved 
to the states under the Tenth Amendment. Id. For historical discussions of this core conflict, 
see Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 409-
33 (1998); David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the 
Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1257-69 (2000); Oona A. 
Hathaway et al., The Treaty Power: Its History, Scope, and Limits, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 239, 279-
304 (2013); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867 
(2005); and Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103 COLUM. L. 
REV. 403 (2003). 
3. The case first reached the Court in 2011, when the Court held petitioner Bond had standing 
to challenge the Chemical Weapons Implementation Act under the Tenth Amendment and 
remanded her case to the Third Circuit to adjudicate her claim on the merits. See Bond v. 
United States, 564 U.S. 211, 214 (2011). Following the approach adopted by much of the liter-
ature on the treaty power, this Comment refers to the 2014 decision as “Bond,” despite the 
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Admittedly, Bond offered the Court an unlikely set of facts through which to 
clarify the scope of the treaty power. After petitioner Carol Ann Bond was caught 
attempting to inflict chemical burns on her husband’s pregnant mistress, she 
was charged with possessing and using a chemical weapon in violation of the 
federal statute implementing the international Chemical Weapons Convention 
(CWC).
4
 Bond argued that charging her under the statute was unconstitutional 
because the statute exceeded Congress’s enumerated powers and invaded pow-
ers reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment.
5
 Rather than definitively 
establish the proper scope of the treaty power in relation to Congress’s enumer-
ated powers, the Court sidestepped the issue, holding simply that Congress 
never intended the statute to extend to Bond’s conduct in the first place.
6
 
The questions of structural federalism left unresolved by Bond hold real-
world significance in today’s era of increasing global interconnectedness. As the 
petitioner and Justice Scalia emphasized in Bond, the scope and subject matter of 
international treaties have expanded dramatically since the Founding Era.
7
 
Whereas late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century treaties typically governed re-
lations between nations, international agreements since the latter half of the 
twentieth century increasingly cover nations’ treatment of their own citizens.
8
 
Without clearer guidance from the Court, it remains possible that the U.S. gov-
ernment could ratify and implement a treaty that abolished solitary confinement 
 
case’s prior appearance before the Court. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Federalism, Treaty Imple-
mentation, and Political Process: Bond v. United States, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 486, 486 (2014); 
William S. Dodge, Bond v. United States and Congress’s Role in Implementing Treaties, 108 AJIL 
UNBOUND 86, 86 (2014); Gary Lawson, Original Foreign Affairs Federalism, 97 B.U. L. REV. 
301, 309 n.41 (2017). 
4. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2085. 
5. Id. 
6. See id. at 2087-90. Compared to the majority opinion, Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito more 
eagerly engaged with the constitutional issues posed by the case, arguing that the treaty power 
did not extend Congress’s legislative power into areas traditionally reserved for state control. 
Id. at 2098 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2103 (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment); id. at 2111 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
7. Id. at 2100 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Brief for Petitioner at 25, Bond, 134 S. Ct. 
2077 (No. 12-158) (citing Robert Knowles, Starbucks and the New Federalism: The Court’s An-
swer to Globalization, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 735, 749-50 (2001)). 
8. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2100 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing ABRAM CHAYES & AN-
TONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGU-
LATORY AGREEMENTS 14 (1995)); see, e.g., Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabil-
ities, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3. 




 imposed new criteria for state adjudication of child removals,
10
 
or otherwise infringed upon powers historically reserved to the states under the 
Tenth Amendment. As Justice Thomas warned in his Bond concurrence, “Given 
the increasing frequency with which treaties have begun to test the limits of the 
Treaty Power,” the Court’s opportunity to “address the scope” of that authority 
again will “come soon enough.”
11
 
To better understand the treaty power, scholars and litigants have drawn on 
historical understandings of the power’s scope, with special emphasis on the 
views of the Framers.
12
 Academics and practitioners alike have debated how the 
Framers conceived of the treaty-making power and whether they envisioned a 
 
9. States run prisons independent of the federal prison system and have historically had great 
leeway to do so, with the principal federal limitations on this authority stemming from the 
U.S. Constitution’s protections for individual rights as incorporated against the States. See, 
e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995). But what would happen if the federal 
government ratified and implemented a treaty expanding the rights of prisoners? For exam-
ple, could the federal government compel state prisons to comply with implementing legisla-
tion that prohibited solitary confinement? Without a clearer understanding of the scope of 
the treaty power the answer is unclear, but at least one scholar has argued in the affirmative. 
See Kathryn D. DeMarco, Note, Disabled by Solitude: The Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities and Its Impact on the Use of Supermax Solitary Confinement, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
523, 554 (2012). 
10. In the United States, family law concerning children is one of the quintessential “areas of law 
traditionally thought to be reserved to the states.” Lainie Rutkow & Joshua T. Lozman, Suffer 
the Children?: A Call for United States Ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 161, 177 (2006) (citing Susan Kilbourne, Student Research, 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child: Federalism Issues for the United States, 5 GEO. J. ON 
FIGHTING POVERTY 327, 327 (1998)). In particular, disputes over child custody, removal, and 
family reunification are almost exclusively governed by state law and fall under the jurisdic-
tion of state and local courts. See Family Law in the 50 States, A.B.A. (Sept. 2017), https://
www.americanbar.org/groups/family_law/resources/family_law_in_the_50_states.html 
[https://perma.cc/QXY3-2BZF]; see, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2201-89 (2018); N.Y. FAM. 
CT. ACT, art. 1, 6, 10, 10-a, 11. In 1995, however, President Clinton signed the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which sought to establish international rules 
for family separation, reunification proceedings, and capital punishment for children—rules 
that conflicted with family law in some U.S. states. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
supra note 8, arts. 3, 9, 10; Rutkow & Lozman, supra, at 171, 177. Although the Senate never 
ratified the CRC, it remains an open question whether the federal government could have 
overridden state family laws and child removal proceedings under the auspices of implement-
ing the CRC. 
11. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2110-11 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
12. See, e.g., id. at 2100 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, 
at 24; Brief for the United States at 29-33, Bond, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (No. 12-158); Brief for Profes-
sors David M. Golove, Martin S. Lederman, and John Mikhail as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondent at 9-11, Bond, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (No. 12-158); Brief of the Yale Law School Center 
for Global Legal Challenges as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 2, 10-13, Bond, 134 
S. Ct. 2077 (No. 12-158) [hereinafter GLC Brief]. 
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power that would enable Congress to supersede contradictory state laws even in 
areas otherwise beyond its enumerated powers.
13
 Unsurprisingly, the Framers 
disagreed on many issues.
14
 Yet, as this Comment lays out, past analyses of the 




This Comment focuses on a heretofore underexplored factor driving the 
Framers’ formulation of the treaty power: the threat of war inherent in all treaty 
violations at the time of the Founding. During this period, the international legal 
order permitted nations to wage war in response to treaty violations—and they 
 
13. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); Bradley, supra note 2; Golove, supra note 2; Oona 
A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the 
United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236 (2008); Hathaway et al., supra note 2. 
14. See Golove, supra note 2, at 1104-15, 1132-40. 
15. Curtis Bradley, Daniel Golove, Oona Hathaway, and Nicholas Quinn Rozenkranz have writ-
ten seminal works examining the origins of the treaty power and its scope. See sources cited 
supra note 2. However, none of these scholars discussed the threat of war inherent in treaty-
making at the time, and none of their works examined the crucial role that factor played in 
the Framers’ formulation of the treaty power. See Bradley, supra note 2, at 409-33; Golove, 
supra note 2, at 1257-69; Hathaway et al., supra note 2, at 279-304; Rosenkranz, supra note 2, 
at 1912-19. Although John Yoo’s work on the original understanding of the treaty power 
quotes James Madison alluding to the risk of war inherent in treaty-making at the time, Yoo 
fails to analyze this reference or discuss the influence it had on the Framers. John C. Yoo, 
Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 2030 (1999). Edwin Dickinson’s 1952 work on the role of the law of 
nations in the United States introduces the same Madison quote in discussing the New Jersey 
Plan, yet Dickinson too fails to discuss the impact that the threat of war embedded in the 
treaty power may have had on the Framers. See Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as 
Part of the National Law of the United States, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26, 38 (1952). Beth Stephens 
does mention that “violations of the laws of nations gave cause for war—a danger very much 
on the minds of the framers as they drafted the Constitution.” Beth Stephens, Federalism and 
Foreign Affairs: Congress’s Power to “Define and Punish . . . Offenses Against the Law of Nations,” 
42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447, 465 (2000). However, Stephens does not identify treaty viola-
tions specifically as a violation of the law of nations that could give rise to war, and Stephens 
only discusses the impact that this risk of war may have had on the formulation of the Offenses 
Clause rather than on the federal treaty power and the Supremacy Clause. See id. at 465-76. 
Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro also recently published a book on the Peace Pact of 1928 
and the evolution of international laws governing war, which notes the high number of war 
manifestos from the fifteenth century to the Second World War that cited treaty violations as 
a just cause for war. OONA A. HATHAWAY & SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, THE INTERNATIONALISTS: HOW 
A RADICAL PLAN TO OUTLAW WAR REMADE THE WORLD 42-44 (2017). Hathaway and Shapiro 
also briefly touch on the role that this legal framework may have had on the Framers. Id. at 44 
(“Violations of international law were not merely a cause for complaint. They were a just cause 
for war . . . . The Framers of the U.S. Constitution understood this well.”). However, Hatha-
way and Shapiro devote only two paragraphs to this discussion and do not examine the role 
that the legal risks inherent in treaty violations may have had in shaping the treaty power and 
Supremacy Clause specifically. Id. 




 As students of Hugo Grotius and Emer de Vattel,
17
 the Framers were 
well aware that breaching a treaty could expose the fledgling United States to 
lawful attack, and that strict laws of neutrality would prevent allies from offering 
their support in the event of war.
18
 These legal realities, combined with concerns 
over potent commercial and diplomatic side effects of treaties, compelled the 
Framers to advocate for a centralized treaty-making power and federal suprem-
acy over state law in this context. 
Our findings confirm that Framers on both sides of the states’ rights debate 
acknowledged that treaties approved by the federal government should take 
precedence over state laws and interests. To the Framers, this design was critical 
to ensuring nationwide compliance with treaty obligations and thus avoiding 
war, diplomatic embarrassment, and commercial harm. Recognizing the broad 
sweep of this power, however, the Framers placed strict structural limits on who 
could wield it and how. They designed these structural safeguards to protect 
states from federal abuse of the treaty power, while still preserving the flexibility 
required for the national government to act effectively in international affairs. In 
sum, the Framers crafted a treaty power strong enough to tightly bind the states, 
but structurally safeguarded to ensure it would be utilized carefully, given the 
high stakes of international commitments. 
 
16. See Oona A. Hathaway et al., War Manifestos, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1139, 1141, 1162-71 (2018). 
17. Hugo Grotius, a Dutch jurist and philosopher from the late sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries, is widely regarded as the “Father of International Law.” HATHAWAY & SHAPIRO, su-
pra note 15, at 27. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, he was “known to all educated 
westerners” and his seminal work The Law of War and Peace was a “foundation for all future 
treatises on international law.” Id. at 27. James Madison, for instance, once noted that Grotius 
“is not unjustly considered . . . the father of the modern code of nations.” Id. (citing James 
Madison, Examination of the British Doctrine, Which Subjects to Capture a Neutral Trade Not 
Open in Time of Peace, in 2 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 1794-1815, at 
230, 234 (1865)). Emer de Vattel, a Swiss lawyer and diplomat, was “[t]he preeminent inter-
national law scholar of the eighteenth century,” id., and also well known to the Framers, id. at 
44. Both Grotius and Vattel wrote extensively on just causes of war under international law, 
including treaty violations. See Hathaway et al., supra note 16, at 1141-42 (citing HUGO GRO-
TIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE: THREE BOOKS 2.1.2.1, at 171 (Francis W. Kelsey, trans., 
1925); EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE, 
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 3.3.26, at 302 (P.H. Nick-
lin & T. Johnson eds., Joseph Chitty trans., 1758)). 
18. Under the laws of neutrality at the time, any state that favored one side over another in a 
war—even through economic support—could face legal attack. See HATHAWAY & SHAPIRO, 
supra note 15, at 44-45. 
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Although much has changed since the Founding Era,
19
 this Comment posits 
that the principles animating the Framers’ formulation of the treaty power re-
main relevant in determining its scope today. One need not adhere to an original-
ist school of constitutional interpretation to appreciate the value of understand-
ing the principles that undergirded the Constitution’s text.
20
 To the degree that 
those principles transcend era-specific considerations, they offer important 
guidance to treaty negotiators, legislators, and courts in interpreting the treaty 
power within a contemporary context. Even if the Framers’ understanding of the 
treaty power does not conclude our constitutional inquiry, it offers a useful be-
ginning. 
This Comment proceeds in three Parts. In Part I, we discuss the Bond case 
and the parties’ arguments concerning historical understandings of the treaty 
power. In Part II, we show that the parties overlooked a key consideration: the 
threat of war posed by treaty negotiations. Here, we examine key factors that 
shaped the original formulation of the treaty power, drawing on primary-source 
materials from the Founding Era. These sources demonstrate that the Framers, 
when drafting the Constitution and promoting it to the public, explicitly raised 
concerns that errant states could entangle the nation in war through treaty vio-
lations. We also identify structural considerations and contemporaneous contro-
versies that reinforced the Framers’ commitment to a centralized treaty power. 
Together, these factors drove the Framers to design a treaty power that would 
enable the federal government to proactively control the states’ engagement with 
foreign nations, thereby protecting the nation from commercial infighting, dip-
lomatic embarrassment, and—most importantly—war. Finally, in Part III we ap-
ply the factors that shaped the formulation of the treaty power to the open ques-
tions of Bond and extract principles that remain salient in interpreting the treaty 
power today. 
 
19. For instance, since the UN Charter was ratified in 1945, no country can legally declare war 
against another for a treaty violation. See HATHAWAY & SHAPIRO, supra note 15, at 212-14. This, 
however, has not stopped nations—including the United States—from invoking treaty viola-
tions as a justification for introducing U.S. armed forces into another nation’s sovereign ter-
ritory in the modern day. See, e.g., Transcript and Video: Trump Speaks About Strikes on Syria, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/world/middleeast 
/transcript-video-trump-airstrikes-syria.html [https://perma.cc/FY7Z-PJAK]; see also infra 
note 117 (outlining two differences between the understanding of treaties in the Founding Era 
and today). 
20. See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 3, 277 (2011); Hathaway et al., supra note 2, at 244 
(examining the history of international lawmaking to better understand the treaty power). 
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i .  bond ’s  competing understandings of the treaty power 
When the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Bond, it failed to resolve cru-
cial questions of the treaty power’s scope.
21
 On the table were two competing 
accounts of the federal treaty power, set forth in the petitioner’s and the govern-
ment’s briefs. Although both sides discussed historical forces that shaped the 
Framers’ understanding, they overlooked a key factor that might have helped the 
Court resolve the constitutional question in Bond: the risk of war embedded in 
treaties at the time of the Founding. Because the Court did not answer the con-
stitutional question in Bond, this issue is likely to resurface in the future. Under-
standing the Framers’ motivations in crafting the treaty power thus remains crit-
ical to resolving finally these disagreements over its scope. 
A core conflict between the litigants’ positions in Bond centered on what the 
Framers valued more in crafting the treaty power: a limited federal government 
designed to protect states’ rights and individual liberty, or a strong federal gov-
ernment capable of pursuing effective foreign policy to protect national interests 
and security. 
On the one hand, the petitioner in Bond highlighted the Framers’ intent to 
“create . . . [a] limited national government with enumerated powers addressed 
to matters of distinctly national and international concern.”
22
 According to 
Bond, if the government could lawfully charge her for a “decidedly local crime” 
under the federal statute implementing the CWC, there would be no limit to 
Congress’s ability to “enact any legislation rationally related to [a] treaty,” even 
if it infringed on states’ authority or individual rights.
23
 All that would be re-
quired to “render the Framers’ careful process of enumerating Congress’[s] lim-
ited powers for naught” would be an “agreement of the President, the Senate, 
and a foreign nation.”
24
 The Framers could not have intended such an outcome, 
Bond argued, and instead must have assumed that subject-matter limits were 




On the other hand, the government emphasized the Framers’ desire to “em-
power[] the Nation to carry out its international legal commitments in further-
ance of U.S. foreign policy and national security goals.”
26
 To maintain the bal-
ance of federal and state power, while still imbuing the federal government with 
 
21. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014). 
22. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at 19. 
23. Id. at 2-3. 
24. Id. at 17. 
25. See id. at 19. 
26. Brief for the United States, supra note 12, at 26. 
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sufficient flexibility to advance effective foreign policy, the Framers imposed 
structural limitations on treaties.
27
 Such an arrangement, the government ar-
gued, “safeguarded the interests of the States by requiring that treaties be ap-
proved by two-thirds of the Senate, which they saw as the protector of State 
sovereignty.”
28
 Although the principles that influenced the treaty power’s origi-
nal development could have persuasively vindicated the government’s structural 
claims, the government did not adequately explain these historical considera-
tions. As Part II will clarify, the Framers opted for rigorous structural and polit-
ical safeguards, instead of subject-matter limitations, to prevent abuse and pre-
serve diplomatic flexibility. 
Rather than settle this debate, the Court avoided the constitutional question 
altogether.
29
 Instead, the Court held that Section 229 of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention Implementation Act simply did not reach Bond’s crime.
30 
Although 
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, he criticized the potential implications 
of the decision. By refusing to resolve the constitutional issue, he argued, the 
decision left Congress “only one treaty away from acquiring a general police 
power,”
31
 given the ever-growing scope of international agreements. Both he 
and Justice Thomas raised concerns that the lack of substantive resolution meant 
that the Court would have to revisit the same issue in a later case.
32
 
Regardless of one’s position on the arguments put forth by the petitioner 
and the government, the fact remains that without a definitive ruling from the 
Court on the treaty-making powers granted to the federal government under 
Article II, lower courts will continue to clash
33
 and the proper balance of federal 
 
27. See id. at 32. 
28. Id. 
29. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2087 (2014) (citing Escambia County v. McMillan, 466 
U.S. 48, 51 (1984) (per curiam); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring)). 
30. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2093; see also Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 
§ 201, 18 U.S.C. § 229(a)(1) (2012) (forbidding any person knowingly “to develop, produce, 
otherwise acquire, transfer directly or indirectly, receive, stockpile, retain, own, possess, or 
use, or threaten to use, any chemical weapon”). 
31. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2101 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
32. Id. at 2102; id. at 2110-11 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
33. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17-22, Bond, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (No. 12-158) (explaining the 
“divergent views within the lower courts” over the scope and meaning of Missouri v. Holland’s 
dictum). On one side, the Third, Second, and Eleventh Circuits have adopted a more expan-
sive reading of Holland, focusing on whether or not the treaty itself is valid. “If the treaty is 
valid,” the Third Circuit has explained, “there can be no dispute about the validity of the [im-
plementing] statute.” United States v. Bond, 681 F.3d 149, 166 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Mis-
souri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920)), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2077; see also United States v. Lue, 
134 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1998) (“If the Hostage Taking Convention is a valid exercise of the 
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and state power where foreign policy and domestic law meet will remain unre-
solved. The constitutional question of Bond remains open and pressing. 
i i .  the threat of war inherent in international treaty-
making and other factors that shaped the framers’  
construction of the treaty power 
Much as the Justices’ and litigants’ positions diverged in Bond, their argu-
ments shared one key similarity: they ignored crucial factors shaping the formu-
lation of the treaty power that remain relevant today. In the Founding Era, treaty 
membership was a serious commitment: under international law, violating 
treaty obligations constituted a just cause for war.
34
 As a young nation facing 
Europe’s great powers, America could not afford to provoke an unconsidered 
war. Furthermore, given that the nation’s economic and political survival de-
pended on its ability to develop its reputation as a reliable trading partner, the 
Framers were concerned with ensuring that the national government could keep 
its word internationally. As our Comment reveals, the potentially catastrophic 
consequences of treaty violations at the time heavily influenced the Framers as 
 
Executive’s treaty power, there is little room to dispute that the legislation passed to effectuate 
the treaty is valid under the Necessary and Proper Clause.” (citing Holland, 252 U.S. at 432)); 
United States v. Ferreira, 275 F.3d 1020, 1027-28 (11th Cir. 2001) (embracing the Second Cir-
cuit’s analysis in Lue regarding congressional authority under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause to implement the Hostage Taking Convention by enacting the Hostage Taking Act). 
According to these courts, where the treaty is a valid exercise of executive power, the only 
remaining question is whether or not “the legislation . . . meet[s] the Necessary and Proper 
Clause’s general requirement that legislation implemented under that Clause be ‘rationally 
related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power.’” Bond, 681 F.3d at 157 
(quoting United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 134 (2010)); Lue, 134 F.3d at 87. On the 
other side, the Ninth and D.C. Circuits have indicated that, even under Holland, the federal 
government’s power to implement treaties is bounded by subject-matter limits. See In re Air-
crash in Bali, Indon. on Apr. 22, 1974, 684 F.2d 1301, 1309 (9th Cir. 1982) (“[T]reaty provi-
sions which create domestic law have the same effect as legislation, and . . . are subject to the 
same substantive limitations as any other legislation.”); Power Auth. of N.Y. v. Fed. Power 
Comm’n, 247 F.2d 538, 543 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (“No court has ever said, however, that the treaty 
power can be exercised without limit to affect matters which are of purely domestic concern 
and do not pertain to our relations with other nations.”), vacated sub nom. Am. Pub. Power 
Ass’n v. Power Auth. of State of N.Y., 355 U.S. 64 (1957). 
34. See Oona A. Hathaway et al., supra note 16, at 1187 (“Of the just war claims made in the man-
ifestos in our collection [of 350 war manifestos issued from 1492 to 1945], 170 were treaty 
violation claims, constituting 12.4 percent of all claims and contained in 51.2 percent of all 
manifestos. Of the 170 manifestos containing treaty claims, 40 (23.5 percent, or 12.0 percent 
of all manifestos) identified this reason as the manifesto’s primary justification.”). For exam-
ple, in the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War from 1780-1784, Great Britain primarily justified its at-
tack on the Netherlands by citing the Netherlands’s alleged violation of the Perpetual Defen-
sive Alliance treaty formed in 1678. See id. at 1189. 
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they crafted the treaty power and promoted it to the American people. This his-
torical context should inform our contemporary understanding of the power’s 
scope and limitations. 
A. Concerns About the Threat of War During the Drafting Process and in 
Contemporaneous Publications 
Not only were the Framers aware that treaty violations could lead to war; 
they were also guided by this threat in their drafting decisions. Although there 
is a “paucity of material directly addressing the scope of the treaty power” from 
the Constitutional Convention,
35
 a close analysis of the ratification debates re-
veals that the Framers expressly considered the risk of war posed by treaty vio-
lations and invoked this threat in their arguments for a centralized treaty power. 
As the following Sections demonstrate, the discussions in the Constitutional 
Convention, state ratifying conventions, Federalist Papers, and other Founding 
Era documents all reveal that the Framers regularly considered the risk of pro-
voking war through treaty violations as they conceived of and developed the 
treaty power. 
1. The Constitutional Convention and the Origins of the Treaty Power 
The threat of provoking war through treaty violations played a critical role 
in the development of the treaty power at the start of the 1787 Convention. In his 
opening speech, Virginia Governor Edmund Randolph outlined the major “de-
fects” of the Articles of Confederation. Chief among these defects was the fact 
that the Articles “d[id] not provide against foreign invasion. If a State act[ed] 
against a foreign power contrary to the laws of nations or violate[d] a treaty, [the 
Confederation could not] punish that State, or compel its obedience to the 
treaty . . . . It therefore [could not] prevent war.”
36
 Randolph’s emphasis on state 
compliance with treaties in order to “prevent war” at the outset of the Conven-
tion provides striking evidence that this threat was at the forefront of the Fram-
ers’ minds as they began the drafting process. Although the two most prominent 
constitutional proposals, the Virginia Plan and the New Jersey Plan, conceived 
of dramatically different executive authorities, they agreed on one central point: 
the United States needed to mitigate the risk of war through mechanisms that 
would ensure state compliance with treaties. 
 
35. Golove, supra note 2, at 1134. 
36. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 23-25 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [here-
inafter FARRAND’S RECORDS]. 
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a. The Virginia Plan 
The debates surrounding the Virginia Plan and the federal “negative” power 
it proposed provide strong evidence that the Framers were aware of and moti-
vated by the threat of war embedded in the treaty power. The Framers of the 
Virginia Plan took national treaty obligations so seriously that they would have 
granted the national legislature the power “[t]o negative all laws, passed by the 
several States, contravening, in the opinion of the national legislature, the arti-
cles of union . . . or any Treaties subsisting under the authority of the union.”
37
 In 
sharp contrast to the limited authority granted by the Articles of Confederation, 
this sweeping power—a predecessor to the Supremacy Clause—would have pro-
vided a direct and immediate way for the national government to enforce state 
compliance with federal treaties. Taken alongside the concern of Governor Ran-
dolph, one of the main proponents of the Virginia Plan, with preventing “foreign 
invasion,” the Virginia Plan’s conception of a national legislature vested with the 
power to negative state laws demonstrates the Framers’ consideration of the 
threat of war posed by treaty violations as they drafted the Constitution. 
The evolution of the Virginia Plan’s negative power further illustrates this 
point. The original version of the Virginia Plan’s negative clause proposed by 
Madison only granted the federal government the power to negative state laws 
“contravening . . . the articles of Union.”
38
 When Benjamin Franklin first added 
“Treaties” to the shelter of the negative clause two days later, the addition gen-
erated no debate or controversy—a rarity at this early stage of the Convention.
39
 
Instead, the delegates appeared largely to agree on the importance of guarantee-
ing state compliance with federal treaty obligations, repeatedly raising the threat 
of provoking war through treaty violations during debates over the clause.
40
 As 
South Carolina delegate Charles Pinkney put it, “[T]he States must be kept in 
due subordination to the nation . . . if the States were left to act of them-
selves . . . it w[ould] be impossible to defend the national prerogatives.”
41
 Under 
the Articles of Confederation, he reminded his colleagues, “foreign treaties [had 
not] escaped repeated violations” that could have ended dangerously for the na-
tion.
42
 Behind the scenes, other Framers made similar arguments. In a letter to 
 
37. Id. at 47 (emphasis added). 
38. Id. at 21. 
39. Id. at 47. 
40. See Golove, supra note 2, at 1102 (“It was famously the difficulty of obtaining state compliance 
with treaties that was among the foremost reasons impelling the movement toward Philadel-
phia, and that experience left an unmistakable imprint on the text adopted.”). 
41. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 36, at 164. 
42. Id. 
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George Washington, Madison argued the “negative [power] in all cases whatso-
ever on the legislative acts of the States . . . appears . . . to be absolutely neces-
sary” in order to prevent the States from “continu[ing] to . . . violate treaties.”
43
 
Treaties were powerful, but they could also be dangerous—a reality evidently 
motivating the Framers who crafted and supported this progenitor of the Su-
premacy Clause and the treaty power. 
b. The New Jersey Plan 
Reflecting the interests of small states at the Convention, the New Jersey 
Plan privileged state sovereignty over a strong national government.
44
 To achieve 
this goal, the New Jersey Plan’s drafters eliminated the negative power alto-
gether, instead replacing it with what would later become the Supremacy 
Clause.
45
 Even as this Plan sought to limit the power of the federal government, 
however, its drafters still recognized the need to enforce treaty obligations. The 
New Jersey Plan’s early version of the Supremacy Clause explicitly identified 
“treaties” as “supreme law of the respective States” and gave the federal govern-
ment authority to “call forth [the] power of the Confederated States” in order to 
“enforce and compel [state] obedience . . . [to national] treaties.”
46
 The drafters’ 
decision to include treaties as “supreme law of the respective States”—in keeping 
with the Virginia Plan’s negative clause—suggests a shared appreciation for the 
importance of ensuring state compliance with treaty obligations, even among 
those Framers who preferred a small federal government.
47
 
The ensuing debates on the New Jersey Plan further reinforce this shared 
concern for upholding international treaty obligations, particularly in light of the 
threat of war. Indeed, many opponents of the New Jersey Plan argued that it did 
not go far enough to mitigate this risk. In a speech critiquing the Plan, Madison 
asked, “Will it prevent those violations . . . of Treaties which if not prevented 
 
43. Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Apr. 16, 1787) (on file with the National 
Archives). 
44. See Aaron T. Knapp, The New Jersey Plan and the Structure of the American Union, 15 GEO. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 615, 618 (2017). 
45. See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 36, at 245. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. William Paterson, one of the New Jersey Plan’s primary drafters, also considered calling 
for unanimous state consent for all federal treaties as another mechanism to ensure state com-
pliance, although it appears he never delivered the speech he prepared on this subject. William 
Paterson, Notes of William Paterson in the Federal Convention of 1787, AVALON PROJECT (2008), 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/patterson.asp [https://perma.cc/83BY-6YPF] 
(“[B]efore a Treaty can be binding, each State must consent.”). 
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must involve us in the calamities of foreign wars?”
48
 According to Madison, 
“[T]he existing confederacy does not sufficiently provide against this evil. The 
proposed amendment to it does not supply the omission. It leaves the will of the 
States as uncontrouled as ever.”
49
 Thus, to opponents, the Plan’s reliance on col-
lective action to enforce compliance with treaty obligations and its rejection of 
the Virginia Plan’s negative power created a potentially fatal flaw: it left the na-
tional government unable to effectively prevent states from violating treaties and 
thus unable to avoid U.S. entanglement in “foreign wars.”
50
 Under this Plan, the 
risk of an errant state exposing the nation to attack simply remained too high. 
Ultimately, this conflict over the negative power was overshadowed by the 
introduction of the bicameral legislature in the Great Compromise.
51
 In the wake 
of this new proposal, the delegates opted for a stronger version of the New Jersey 
Plan’s Supremacy Clause in lieu of the negative power. Delegates believed the 
negative power was no longer necessary “if sufficient Legislative authority 
should be given to the Genl. Government” and the courts via the Supremacy 
Clause.
52
 Notably, however, throughout these debates no Framer questioned the 
importance of including treaties in the Supremacy Clause. This component re-
mained a key fixture of the final version: “all Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the 




2. State Ratifying Conventions 
As they debated the draft Constitution, delegates to the state ratifying con-
ventions explicitly identified treaty violations as just causes of war on multiple 
 
48. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 36, at 316. 
49. Id. The very same day that Madison raised these concerns, the Convention voted to table the 
New Jersey Plan. See Knapp, supra note 44, at 618. 
50. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 36, at 316. Madison later raised related concerns that, under 
the New Jersey Plan, the national government could not prevent states from concluding their 
own independent treaties. Id. at 326-27. 
51. See 2 id. at 13-21; MELVIN YAZAWA, CONTESTED CONVENTIONS: THE STRUGGLE TO ESTABLISH 
THE CONSTITUTION AND SAVE THE UNION, 1787-1789, at 62 (2016); Yoo, supra note 15, at 2031-
32. 
52. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 36, at 27; see also id. at 28 (recounting the Framers’ discus-
sion of the negative power as unnecessary). 
53. Id. at 663. 
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occasions, expressing concern over the perils one state might bring upon the oth-
ers.
54
 Delegates generally drew these connections as support for why the treaty 
power should be centralized in the federal government and why federal law—or 
at least federal treaties—must supersede contradictory state law. 
For example, in the Virginia ratification debates, delegate William Grayson 
referenced the “law of nations” and just-war theory as reasons to centralize the 
treaty power in the hands of federal authorities: “If I recall rightly, by the law of 
nations, if a negotiator makes a treaty . . . , non-compliance with his stipulations 
is a just cause of war.”
55
 Grayson’s point was that the looser model for treaty 
making and approval of the Articles of Confederation was dangerous; unless 
treaties made by the federal government carried authority over state-made law, 
they were not only useless, but worse still, they exposed the United States to 
legally justified attack. 
Madison also directly identified treaty noncompliance as a cause for war dur-
ing the Virginia ratifying convention: 
Here the supremacy of a treaty is contrasted with the supremacy of the 
laws of the states. It cannot be otherwise supreme. If it does not super-
sede their existing laws, as far as they contravene its operation, it cannot 
be of any effect. To counteract it by the supremacy of the state laws, would 
bring on the Union the just charge of national perfidy, and involve us in war.
56
 
Unless treaties made by the federal government carried authority over state-
made law, in Madison’s view, they could lead to legal liability and potentially 
war. The federal government needed to wield ultimate authority—at least when 
it came to treaties—because the inability of the federal government to comply 
with its treaty obligations would not only ruin the United States’ reputation as a 
treaty partner, but also expose the new country to legally justified attack. 
In keeping with this theme, Robert Livingston, a delegate to the New York 
ratifying convention, explicitly identified treaty violations as a just cause of war 
in support of his argument for federal judicial review of treaties. In his view, if 
states were given leeway in treaty interpretation, “it would be in the power of 
any state to commit the honor of the Union, defeat their most beneficial treaties, 
and involve them in a war.”
57
 The Framers were indeed concerned with what 
might happen should the power to form treaties be held widely or taken lightly. 
 
54. See, e.g., 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FED-
ERAL CONSTITUTION 342, 515 (Johnathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DE-
BATES]. 
55. Id. at 342. 
56. Id. at 515 (emphasis added). 
57. 2 id. at 215. 
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Their references to treaty noncompliance as a just cause of war demonstrate their 
recognition that a well-crafted treaty power could reduce the United States’ risk 
of attack. 
3. The Federalist Papers and Other Contemporary Publications 
The Federalist Papers and other publications from the Founding Era provide 
further evidence that the Framers not only understood the legal obligations and 
risks inherent in treaties, but also saw the Constitution’s protections against 
these dangers as a selling point. As early as 1784, Alexander Hamilton directly 
invoked both Vattel and Grotius
58
 in his “Letter from Phocion to the Considerate 
Citizens of New York,” in which he criticized New York for flagrantly violating 
the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain less than a year after it had been con-
cluded.
59
 By breaching the treaty with Great Britain, Hamilton argued, New 
York had brought “infinite injury” to the nation and opened the door to recipro-
cal noncompliance by Great Britain, or worse.
60
 Hamilton’s explicit references to 
Vattel and Grotius—who wrote extensively on the legal justifications for war, 
including treaty noncompliance—demonstrate his familiarity with the threat of 
war inherent in treaty violations. That Hamilton chose to invoke these scholars 
in a public letter written to put pressure on the New York State Legislature also 
suggests that state officials and informed voters at the time of the Founding were 
aware of the risks that treaties imposed on the nation, including the prospect of 
war. 
Similarly, in two of the earliest Federalist Papers, John Jay explicitly appealed 
to the threat of war inherent in treaty violations to persuade states to ratify the 
Constitution. In making the case for national unity, Jay noted that “[t]he just 
causes of war, for the most part, arise either from violation of treaties or from 
direct violence.”
61
 As a result, Jay stated, “[i]t is of high importance to the peace 
of America that she observe the laws of nations towards all these powers, 





58. For a discussion of Vattel and Grotius and their historical importance, see supra note 17. 
59. See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, A LETTER FROM PHOCION TO THE CONSIDERATE CITIZENS OF NEW 
YORK (Jan. 27, 1784), reprinted in 3 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 483, 491-92 (Harold C. 
Syrett ed., 1962) (“Breach of treaty on our part will be a just ground for breaking it on 
theirs. . . .The wilful breach of a single article annuls the whole.”) [hereinafter LETTER FROM 
PHOCION]. 
60. Id. at 492. 
61. THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, at 10 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
62. Id. at 11. 
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Hamilton employed this same refrain to great effect in Federalist No. 22. Be-
cause “[t]he treaties of the United States, under the present Constitution, are 
liable to the infractions of thirteen different legislatures,” he argued, “[t]he faith, 
the reputation, the peace of the whole Union, are thus continually at the mercy of 
the prejudices, the passions, and the interests of every member of which it is 
composed.”
63
 The references by Jay, Hamilton, and Madison
64
 to the threat of 
war posed by treaty noncompliance demonstrate the Framers’ familiarity with 
this principle of international law and their belief that appealing to it would help 
convince the American people to adopt the Constitution, as it had convinced 
their colleagues during the drafting process. 
In sum, an extensive body of historical evidence—including Convention rec-
ords, the state ratification debates, and the Federalist Papers—reveals that the 
Framers understood the risk of war inherent in treaty obligations and accounted 
for it in their decision-making while designing the treaty power. The Framers 
recognized that without a radical departure from the Articles of Confederation, 
the United States would remain powerless to prevent state treaty breaches and, 
consequently, internationally justified attack. 
B. Other Strategic Concerns: Diplomacy and Commerce 
The threat of war posed by treaty violations loomed large in the minds of the 
Framers as they drafted the treaty power, but it was not the only concern driving 
their desire for a centralized treaty-making authority. In particular, the Framers 
also focused on: (1) the need to be taken seriously as a national government by 
the European powers; and (2) the need to coordinate national trade policy to 
prevent foreign trading partners from playing states off one another. The Fram-
ers’ diplomatic and commercial concerns over treaty compliance further moti-
vated them to build centralized control and enforcement mechanisms into the 
new Constitution. Taken alongside the fear of inciting military attack, these mo-
tivations help inform our understanding of the scope of the treaty power in the 
Founding Era and today—as a centralized power constrained by structural, and 
not subject-matter, limitations. 
 
63. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, supra note 61, at 119 (Alexander Hamilton). 
64. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, supra note 61, at 233 (James Madison) (discussing the ability of 
“any indiscreet member [of the Confederation] to embroil the confederacy with foreign na-
tions” under the Articles of Confederation because the “articles contain[ed] no provision for 
the case of offences against the law of nations”). 
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1. Diplomatic Considerations 
First, in addition to fears of attack, the Framers’ desire to be taken seriously 
by the European powers also influenced their vision of the treaty power. As the 
Framers negotiated the new Constitution, they were frustrated by America’s 
weak position on the international stage.
65
 The inability of the federal govern-
ment to force states to allow the collection of prewar British debts—a key provi-
sion of the Treaty of Peace, under which Great Britain recognized the United 
States as an independent nation—had been a source of great embarrassment to 
the Framers.
66
 Furthermore, because Congress lacked the authority to ensure 
state compliance with federal treaties under the Articles of Confederation, U.S. 
diplomats were not taken seriously in negotiations with the European powers.
67
 
James Wilson of Pennsylvania directly invoked these diplomatic impedi-
ments as he argued for a centralized treaty power that would take precedence 
over state law: “What is the reason that Great Britain does not enter into a com-
mercial treaty with us? Because Congress has not the power to enforce its ob-
servance. But give them those powers . . . and they will have more permanency 
than a monarchical government.”
68
 As Robert Livingston of New York warned, 
if states had a role in diplomacy, they could “commit the honor of the Union” to 
agreements as they wished, without regard for treaties carefully designed by the 
federal government to promote the national interest, such as the Treaty of 
Peace.
69
 Unless and until Congress could demonstrate its control of the states to 
Europe, the United States would continue operating at a diplomatic disad-
vantage. Thus, the Framers adopted a strong centralized treaty power partly out 
of a desire to preempt states from involving themselves in treaty negotiations. A 
stronger federal hand at the negotiating table would prevent foreign nations 
from playing to individual state interests and would encourage European powers 
to take the federal government seriously as the sole diplomatic representative of 
the United States. 
 
65. See Golove, supra note 2, at 1102-03. 
66. See id. at 1115-16; see also 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 54, at 124, 526. 
67. See Golove, supra note 2, at 1114-16; see also 9 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 107-15 (Julian P. 
Boyd ed., 1954) (detailing complaints from the French Minister Count de Vergennes regard-
ing alleged state noncompliance with a French treaty); id. at 139-46 (describing how the 
French Minister postponed Jefferson’s meeting on “the whole Subject of our Commerce with 
France” and made Jefferson wait while a “Number of Audiences of Ambassadors and other 
Ministers . . . t[ook] Place of Course before [his]”). 
68. 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 54, at 451. 
69. 2 id. at 215. 
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2. National Coordination of Trade Policy 
In addition to diplomatic considerations, the Framers centralized the treaty-
making power because they recognized state involvement in the process would 
be detrimental to the U.S. economy as a whole. If states had the power to form 
and enforce their own commercial agreements, or were given an outsized role in 
negotiating federal treaties, states would compete against each other for foreign 
trade deals. Delegates to the federal and state ratifying conventions frequently 
referenced the need to coordinate trade policies by placing the treaty power solely 
in the hands of the federal government.
70
 In one such discussion, state delegates 
discussed commercial treaties the United States had already formed with Sweden 
and the Netherlands, and the need for national coordination: “[S]uch internal 
arrangements should be made as may strictly comport with the faith of those 
treaties . . . . If the legislature of each state adopts its own measures, many and 
very eminent disadvantages must . . . necessarily result therefrom.”
71
 Were indi-
vidual state legislatures able to enact their own trade policies, it would be impos-
sible to achieve uniform treaty interpretation or present a united national front 
in commercial treaty negotiations. 
These fears were well grounded in recent history: an incident in which a Eu-
ropean power had played different states off one another had seriously threat-
ened the young nation’s unity a year earlier.
72
 From 1785 to 1786, Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs John Jay had been negotiating the boundaries between the 
United States and the Spanish territories in North America with Spanish Am-
bassador Don Diego de Gardoqui.
73
 One of the most contentious issues during 
the negotiations was whether Spain would reopen portions of the Mississippi 
River that flowed through its territory to U.S. traffic. Southern states desperately 
wanted access to the Mississippi’s southern stretches for their agricultural pop-
ulations to press westward, while Spain was hesitant to facilitate further U.S. 
exploration of Spanish territory.
74
 Instead of river access, Gardoqui proposed a 
 
70. See id. at 79, 112, 124; see also Alexander Hamilton, The Defence No. XXXVI, N.Y. HERALD (Jan. 
2, 1796), reprinted in 20 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 59, at 3, 9 (remarking 
that the Constitution “vests the power of making Treaties in The President with consent of the 
Senate”). 
71. 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 54, at 112. 
72. The postwar negotiation and implementation of the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain offered 
the Framers similar lessons regarding the need for a mechanism to enforce state compliance 
with treaties, even when articles of the treaty were difficult or painful to follow. See Golove, 
supra note 2, at 1115-16. 
73. See Golove, supra note 2, at 1133; see also Michael Allen, The Mississippi River Debate, 1785-1787, 
36 TENN. HIST. Q. 447 (1977); Charles Warren, The Mississippi River and the Treaty Clause of 
the Constitution, 2 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 271 (1934). 
74. See Allen, supra note 73, at 447. 
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commercial treaty detrimental to southern states but extremely attractive to 
northern states with port cities.
75
 Congress deadlocked as a result of his offer, 
largely because of the North’s and South’s competing visions for the country’s 
economic and territorial future and confusion over the treaty-approval process 
under the Articles of Confederation.
76
 Those in favor of Gardoqui’s proposal—
delegates from seven of the thirteen states—argued that the Articles permitted a 
simple majority to change the instructions to Jay, and they endorsed his ac-
ceptance of the Spanish proposal.
77
 However, southern representatives insisted 
the United States must not concede navigation rights to the Mississippi River 
for any period of time. It quickly became clear that even if the United States and 
Spain agreed to the Jay-Gardoqui Treaty internationally, it would never receive 




Although the Treaty was never ratified, the Jay-Gardoqui controversy arose 
repeatedly in the debates over which entities should be able to make treaties, how 
the process would operate, and how those treaties would be enforced. Southern 
delegates raised concerns that the nine-state approval requirement would not 
adequately protect their regional economic and territorial interests.
79
 Madison 
and other proponents of popular sovereignty assuaged these concerns, however, 
by pointing to the new Constitution’s key protection against tribalism in treaty 
negotiations: the role of the executive in the treaty-making process. There was 
no need for concern, they argued, because the President would “more naturally 
revolt against a measure which might bring on him the reproach not only of 
partiality, but of a dishonorable surrender of a national right.”
80
 The controversy 
led the Framers to place the treaty power solely in the hands of the federal gov-
ernment and to give broad negotiation authority to the President, as states would 




75. See id. at 454-55. 
76. See id. at 455-56; see also Golove, supra note 2, at 1133. 
77. See Golove, supra note 2, at 1133. 
78. See Allen, supra note 73, at 464-65. 
79. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 36, at 297-98; see also Golove, supra note 2, at 1133 
(“Continuing fear that the Northern states would make another attempt to cede the nation’s 
territorial rights in the Mississippi River played a major role in the discussions of the treaty 
power.”). One southern delegate even raised concerns that “the Senate . . . could already sell 
the whole Country by means of Treaties.” 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 36, at 297. 
80. Letter from James Madison to George Nicholas (May 17, 1788), reprinted in 9 THE DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 804, 808 (John P. Kaminski & 
Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1990). 
81. See Golove, supra note 2, at 1133. 
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Thus, in addition to the threat of war, the Framers contemplated the need to 
establish U.S. diplomatic credibility on the world stage and to coordinate na-
tional trade policy in crafting the treaty power. Along with the fear of provoking 
attack, these concerns motivated the Framers to centralize the treaty-making au-
thority in the federal government and to strengthen enforcement over the states, 
while still creating flexible bounds to its scope. To the Framers, this flexibility 
was key to effective diplomatic negotiations and trade policies—critical elements 
of foreign policy for the young nation. 
i i i .  interpreting the treaty power today 
A. Implications for Bond 
Drawing upon this more complete understanding of the Founding Era con-
ception of the treaty power, we return to the central question in Bond: what are 
the limits to Congress’s ability to implement an Article II treaty? More specifi-
cally, what do the debates of the Framers tell us about Congress’s ability to reg-
ulate intrastate activities, such as Carol Bond’s “purely local crime,”
82
 when im-
plementing an Article II treaty? 
To begin, our findings indicate that subject-matter limitations are a histori-
cally incongruent means of cabining Congress’s power to implement Article II 
treaties.
83
 In her briefing before the Court, Bond argued that Congress’s author-
ity to enact legislation implementing an Article II treaty “depends on the exist-
ence of a nexus to a matter of national or international importance.”
84
 Justice 
Thomas echoed this argument in his concurrence, suggesting that subject-mat-




Yet the history we describe above shows that the Framers did not rely on sub-
ject-matter limitations—or the degree of a treaty’s “international importance”—
 
82. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2083 (2014). 
83. This finding aligns with the Third Restatement’s conclusion that “the Constitution does not 
require that an international agreement deal only with ‘matters of international concern.’” 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 302 cmt. c 
(AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
84. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at 29. 
85. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2103 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Bradley, supra note 
2, at 433-39 (criticizing the view that the delegation of the treaty power to the federal govern-
ment precludes meaningful subject-matter limitations). But see LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AF-
FAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 197 (2d ed. 1996) (finding “no basis for read-
ing into the Constitution such a limitation on the subject matter of treaties”). 
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to ground the treaty power. Rather, to ensure that the federal government pos-
sessed sufficient flexibility to craft effective foreign policy and safeguard the na-
tion from foreign threats, the Framers intentionally eschewed subject-matter 
limitations.
86
 That several Founding Era treaties centered on traditional topics 
of foreign affairs, such as peace and trade, does not detract from the broad scope 
of the treaty power as originally crafted. As Randolph put it, “The various con-




Indeed, neither petitioner Bond nor any of the Justices offered a set of metrics 
to determine when conduct is sufficiently “international” to permit federal reg-
ulation under the treaty power. Had they tried to do so, they would have had to 
choose between specifying ex ante certain “international” topics on which trea-
ties could be concluded, or permitting judges to make individual determinations 
of a treaty’s “domestic” versus “international” subject matter.
88
 The former con-
travenes the Framers’ deliberate decision not to enumerate subjects for which 
Article II treaties could be made.
89
 The latter would endow judges with im-
mense, and arguably arbitrary, discretion over how to distinguish domestic from 
international activity, given the ever-increasing overlap between the two catego-
ries. One court, for example, might conclude that domestic production of an un-
usually harsh pesticide sold exclusively in-state by a locally owned company was 
a purely “domestic” activity, unsuitable for regulation by treaty. Another court 
might conclude that, because certain toxins in pesticides run off into waterways 
and are extremely harmful to ocean life, regulation of such toxins is an “interna-
tional” subject perfectly capable of being addressed by treaty. 
This is not to say that the Framers necessarily intended for treaties to address 
purely domestic issues, such as Bond’s “local crime.”
90
 Far from it. The Framers 
remained attentive to protecting state interests and established strict structural 
and political checks to prevent such transgressions.
91
 They constructed a treaty 
power demanding broad consensus for its use, requiring two thirds of the Senate 
to give advice and consent before the President may ratify a treaty, and then ma-
jorities in each house of Congress to pass implementing legislation for non-self-
executing treaties.
92
 When faced with the trade-off between placing subject-
 
86. See Golove, supra note 2, at 1091; infra Section III.B (discussing our third principle). 
87. 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 54, at 363. 
88. See Hathaway et al., supra note 2, at 285-86. 
89. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
90. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2083 (majority opinion). 
91. See infra Section III.B (discussing our second and third principles). 
92. Hathaway, supra note 13, at 1273, 1318-20. 
the yale law journal 128:843  2019 
864 
matter limitations on the federal treaty power or establishing structural and po-
litical limitations, the Framers chose structural controls. This choice preserved 
the flexibility critical for effective foreign policy, while still protecting the inter-
ests of the states. Recognizing the importance of international collaboration, the 
Framers presciently entrusted the federal government with the adaptability to 
shape and benefit from novel areas of global cooperation—today including ef-
forts to combat extremism, cyberattacks, and environmental destruction. 
Examining the Chemical Weapons Implementation Act in Bond in light of 
these considerations, we believe—as the Court did—that charging Bond under 
the Act was an inappropriate use of the statute, because it did not comport with 
the intentions of the treaty negotiators and Congress in drafting and approving 
the international agreement and implementing legislation.
93
 Given the capability 
and traditional responsibility of the state to respond to her crime, which, while 
employing unusual means, had a purely domestic, interpersonal motivation, the 
Court was right to thoroughly scrutinize Congress’s legislative intent.
94
 Absent 
“clear indication” that Congress intended to reach Bond’s crime, the Chemical 
Weapons Implementation Act should not have been so construed.
95
 As our find-
ings indicate, the Framers placed great weight on careful deliberation on inter-
national treaties;
96
 to read into implementing legislation that which was not 
plainly stated, especially where other core constitutional principles are impli-
cated, would contravene that design. 
Were the Act’s drafters to have demonstrated such clear intention to crimi-
nalize local conduct through the treaty, however, it would have been a different 
matter. In such a case, the reviewing court’s inquiry would have turned on the 
process of enacting the treaty and implementing legislation to confirm that the 
treaty had satisfied each level of executive and congressional review. Any famili-
arity with the federal government today suggests such a scenario is extremely 
unlikely: it is hard to imagine a supermajority of the Senate and then majorities 
of both houses and the President agreeing to implement the Chemical Weapons 
Convention with clear intent to reach everyday criminal activity covered by local 
 
93. See Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2083, 2089-93. 
94. Were Bond motivated by political or terrorist ideology, rather than matrimonial rage, and had 
she used the chemicals to create a weapon capable of harming large numbers of people, rather 
than one, there would have been a better argument for charging her under the Act. This is 
because the treaty more explicitly purports to regulate “warfare” and because the global, in-
terconnected nature of terrorism requires a nationally coordinated response. Had Bond been 
in a position of political power relative to her victim and employed sufficiently brutal acts, she 
also could have been charged appropriately under federal legislation implementing the Con-
vention Against Torture. However, the hyperlocal nature of Bond’s conduct does not call for 
the heightened federal response that would be justified by these hypothetical situations. 
95. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2083. 
96. See supra Part II. 
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criminal codes and motivated by personal rather than political conflicts. Even 
accepting this hypothetical, however, our findings indicate that constitutional 
protections from federal abuse of the treaty power would stem not from the sub-
ject matter of the treaty, but from the structural controls that render such abuse 
effectively impossible. If Congress had intended the Act to cover hyperlocal con-
duct such as Bond’s, Congress would have needed to make its intent clear, and 
the Act would have had to withstand several stages of executive and congres-
sional scrutiny—in both the treaty-making and the legislative process—to carry 
legal force. Given that Congress did no such thing, the Court was correct to es-
chew application of the Act to Bond. 
B. Principles for Interpreting the Treaty Power 
Drawing on a more complete understanding of how the Framers thought 
about treaties in their lifetimes, and the implications of this history for Bond, 
three principles stand out. These underlying principles drove the Framers’ for-
mulation of the treaty power and remain relevant to our interpretation of the 
Constitution today. Taken together, they offer useful guidance for understand-
ing the possibilities and limits of the treaty power in Bond’s aftermath. 
The first principle is that the United States must speak to the international 
community with one voice: that of the federal government. In matters of war, 
trade, and diplomacy, the Framers were keen to centralize control at a national 
level, and to prevent individual states from conducting rogue diplomacy or re-
fusing to comply with federal treaties.
97
 For the Framers, the stakes were exis-
tential. Errant state behavior could lead to the “calamities of foreign wars,”
98
 and 
very nearly did under the Articles of Confederation.
99
 The Framers also feared 
that permitting states to pursue their own foreign policy agendas would cripple 
the federal government’s credibility and leverage abroad.
100
 Although contem-
porary circumstances differ, the underlying principle remains important: any 
 
97. See 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 54, at 215; 3 id. at 515; 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 
36, at 24-25, 164; LETTER FROM PHOCION, supra note 59, at 489-92; THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, 
supra note 61, at 10-11 (John Jay). 
98. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 36, at 316. 
99. See Golove, supra note 2, at 1116 (noting that “[a]t times, war [with Great Britain] seemed 
imminent” as some states resisted complying with the Treaty of Peace under the Articles of 
Confederation). 
100. The Framers’ worry was that state abrogation of national treaty commitments would under-
cut the credibility of the federal government and those who represent the nation abroad. The 
Framers were also concerned that states’ actions could harm foreign governments’ perceptions 
of the U.S. federal government’s strength by advancing conflicting positions on an issue of 
international importance. 
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modern understanding of the federal government’s treaty-making power must 
be strong enough to bind the whole nation to our international commitments. 
The second principle is that the United States must take its treaty commit-
ments seriously. This proposition was so important to the Framers that they cre-
ated one of the most demanding thresholds for treaty ratification in the world,
101
 
with multiple stages of congressional and executive review before a treaty can 
take effect.
102
 Because breaching a treaty in the Founding Era could lead to war, 
the Framers saw the need for diligent caution in entering into any international 
obligation. Having witnessed the fallout from the Jay-Gardoqui treaty, the 
Framers recognized that the best way to ensure that treaty obligations would be 
upheld was to enter into them only with consensus across branches of the federal 
government. Thus, the threat of legal attack stemming from treaty breaches in 
the Founding Era explains the cautious design of the treaty power, and reflects 
the Framers’ beliefs that international agreements were not to be entered into 
casually—and that when they were entered into, they were to be strictly en-
forced. 
The third principle is that structural, not subject-matter, limits bound the 
federal treaty power. As Thomas Jefferson, one of the staunchest advocates of 
 
With regard to contemporary federal-state treaty contestation, California, New York, and 
eleven other states’ plan to comply with the Paris Agreement on climate change even after the 
Trump administration’s withdrawal raises interesting questions regarding the principle of re-
serving international affairs for the federal government. See Jerry Brown & Michael Bloom-
berg, Even Without the Trump Administration, the U.S. Is Upholding Its Commitment to the Paris 
Climate Agreement, L.A. TIMES (Sep. 12, 2018, 4:15 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion
/op-ed/la-oe-brown-bloomberg-climate-summit-20180912-story.html [https://perma.cc
/VHY4-AJES]; Christopher Cadelago, The Global Partnership Fighting Climate Change Ex-
pands. Is Trump Helping the Cause?, SACRAMENTO BEE (Nov. 9, 2017, 12:01 AM), https://www
.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article183583516.html [https://perma
.cc/AZ44-EDKN]; Lauren Sommer, If Trump Rejects Paris Climate Treaty, Could California Sign 
on?, KQED (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.kqed.org/science/1228567/if-trump-wont-can 
-california-sign-the-international-climate-treaty [https://perma.cc/SK5Z-E5UH]; Office of 
Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr., U.S. Climate Alliance Adds 10 New Members to Coalition Com-
mitted to Upholding the Paris Accord (June 5, 2017), https://www.gov.ca.gov/2017/06/05
/news19831 [https://perma.cc/KCC6-GBNE]. In one view, these states are acting in direct 
defiance of current federal policy toward climate change and circumventing the federal gov-
ernment to cooperate directly with foreign nations on these issues. However, these states are 
voluntarily complying with a treaty to which the United States technically remains a party, at 
least until 2020, and have not negotiated or concluded additional, formal treaties. As such, 
although these states’ actions would violate this guiding principle of the Framers, we do not 
suggest they are illegal. 
101. Hathaway, supra note 13, at 1271-74 (indicating that the United States is the only country in 
the world to require a supermajority in one legislative house to ratify treaties, while also ex-
cluding the lower house from that process). 
102. See id.; supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
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states’ rights in the Founding Era, admitted, “To what subjects [the treaty] 
power extends has not been defined in detail by the [C]onstitution.”
103
 Indeed, 
as the Framers well understood, structural limits are the only means of main-
taining firm constitutional constraints on federal action while still allowing the 
government sufficient flexibility to respond strategically to international events. 
Operational flexibility was key to achieving the status and respect abroad that 
the Framers desired. For them, the decision not to specify the subjects of the 
treaty power was uncontroversial because there was no way to account for all 
situations that might require the federal government to coordinate internation-
ally.
104
 Rather than enumerate specific subjects for which the federal government 
could engage in treaties, the Framers relied on structural bounds to prevent 
abuse of the treaty power.
105
 
However, it is crucial to note that the structural limitations built into the fed-
eral government’s treaty-making authority do not imply the existence of a de 
facto police power—that is, a general ability to reach the conduct of citizens out-
side of Congress’s enumerated powers. Our findings do not suggest that the 
Framers had any intention to create such an authority, but rather that they found 
structural bounds sufficient to prevent the federal government from fabricating 
a police power.
106
 Moreover, the Court has consistently said that the treaty power 
could never be construed to “authorize what the [C]onstitution forbids”
107
 by 
“contravening any prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution,”
108
 such 
as the individual rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights. Accordingly, we find the 
 
103. THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE FOR THE USE OF THE SENATE OF 
THE UNITED STATES 97 (U.S. Gov’t Printing Office 1993) (1801), https://www.senate.gov 
/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/SDoc103-8.pdf [https://perma.cc/DW7M-7NA8]. 
104. See 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 54, at 504, 514-15; Hathaway et al., supra note 2, at 246-50; 
see also Golove, supra note 2, at 1132-35, 1138, 1145 (discussing evidence from the Constitutional 
Convention and explaining that “with only one arguable exception, no one suggested that the 
treaty power would be limited to those subjects over which Congress could otherwise regulate 
pursuant to its legislative powers”). 
105. See Hathaway et al., supra note 2, at 246-50; see also Golove, supra note 2, at 1134-35. It follows 
that because of these structural bounds, the expansive subjects of modern treaties, such as the 
prohibition of chemical weapons, are not an immediate cause for alarm. 
106. See Hathaway et al., supra note 2, at 248-50 (describing the Framers’ concern for preventing 
an implied federal police power, and discussing the Framers’ decision to impose “structural 
and political limits” on the treaty power, rather than subject-matter limitations). 
107. De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890); see also GLC Brief, supra note 12, at 18. 
108. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920); see also GLC Brief, supra note 12, at 18. 
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theatrical hypotheticals raised in Bond to be overstated.
109
 In practice, the indi-
vidual protections of the Bill of Rights and the strict structural limitations placed 
on the Article II treaty power render such gross misuse effectively impossible.
110
 
Even without subject-matter limitations on treaties, courts still have a role to 
play in determining the legitimacy of a treaty and its implementing legislation. 
They can look to the enactment process to ensure that the treaty at issue complies 
with the Constitution’s structural restraints. They can also seek to determine 
that a treaty is bona fide.
111
 Is there a genuine quid pro quo involved? Are the 
parties to a treaty each getting something that they want? Do mutual obligations 
flow directly from its terms? As Jefferson said, if it does not “concern the foreign 
nation party to the contract . . . it is a mere nullity.”
112
 
Under this analysis, the CWC and its implementing legislation, as under-
stood by the Bond Court, reflect its signatories’ mutual interest in avoiding the 
use of chemical weapons in war crimes and terrorist acts through collective com-
mitment to prevent the production, distribution, and use of these weapons.
113
 
Applying this analysis, a court would uphold the CWC as a genuine mutual com-
mitment between nations. A bona fide agreement reached between independent 
nations that has withstood the approval procedures established by the Framers 
must be treated as the supreme law of the land.
114
 Courts can help ensure bona 
fide agreements are upheld by analyzing how they came to be and how they re-
flect agreement on interests shared between countries. Importantly, this form of 
judicial review is far more limited than examining the subject matter of treaties; 
to understand whether a treaty is “bona fide” requires only a determination that 
a mutual exchange of promises occurred. Where a quid pro quo between two or 
 
109. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2100-02 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(warning that under the logic of the majority opinion, the federal government could, for ex-
ample, “reenact the invalidated part of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 . . . just so 
long as there were a treaty on point” or enter into an Antipolygamy Convention requiring 
legislation preventing a polygamist widower from inheriting his wives’ estates even though 
the power to enact inheritance law is traditionally reserved to the states). 
110. We could find no instance of the treaty power ever being abused in this manner in U.S. his-
tory, nor do we anticipate courts to permit clear violations of the constitutional rights of U.S. 
citizens to advance foreign policy interests. 
111. See HENKIN, supra note 85, at 185 (noting that valid treaties must be “a bona fide agreement, 
between states, not a ‘mock-marriage’”); Hathaway et al., supra note 2, at 326 (“A . . . limita-
tion on the treaty power is a prohibition on the power of the federal government to enact a 
purely pretextual treaty.”); Interview with Jack Balkin, Professor, Yale Law Sch., in New Ha-
ven, Conn. (Oct. 1, 2018) (discussing the judiciary’s role in reviewing bona fide treaties). 
112. JEFFERSON, supra note 103, at 97. 
113. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2087 (majority opinion). 
114. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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As the Framers debated and developed the treaty power, they were motivated 
by a diverse set of fears, frustrations, and past experiences. Many realities guid-





 However, even as the Framers reimagined the ideal structure of a 
national government, they respected the gravity of international legal commit-
ments and played by the rules of the game when it came to international law.
118
 
They accepted the risks of treaty membership and the structure and subjects of 
treaties as legal realities, and constructed the treaty power accordingly. Thus, 
these contextual differences, while important to note, do not prevent the Fram-
ers’ understanding of the treaty power from informing ours today. Rather, the 
principles driving the construction of the treaty power—(1) the importance of 
speaking with one voice internationally; (2) the need to take international legal 
commitments seriously; and (3) the preference for structural over subject-matter 
limitations—provide key bounds for negotiating and interpreting treaties in the 
modern era. 
conclusion 
As the Framers drafted the treaty power and debated its scope, they struck a 
balance between two competing sets of fears. Their first concern was that a 
strong federal government would become monarchical, trampling the rights of 
the states and their citizens. Their second concern was that creating a role for 
 
115. See HENKIN, supra note 85, at 185 (discussing the meaning of a “bona fide” treaty). 
116. See supra note 19. 
117. Two particular features distinguish treaties of the Founding Era from those of today. The first 
is the liability of a treaty commitment: prior to the ratification of the UN Charter in 1945, the 
international legal order allowed for parties to a treaty to lawfully attack another treaty party 
that breached its terms. See HATHAWAY & SHAPIRO, supra note 15, at xv-xvii, 199-213. As such, 
in the Founding Era, signing on to a treaty meant accepting a risk that the United States could 
be attacked if it failed to comply—a risk that does not exist to the same extent today. The 
second is the scope of treaties. Before World War II, treaties were typically bilateral. In the last 
several decades, however, treaties have included more parties, resembling “international ‘leg-
islation.’” Bradley, supra note 2, at 396. Consequently, the Framers likely could not have con-
ceived of a multilateral treaty such as the CWC, with 165 signatories agreeing to a complex 
schedule for the global destruction of chemical weapons. At their core, though, this treaty and 
those of the Founding Era still represent the same commitment: a willful, affirmative agree-
ment with another independent sovereign to act in a mutually agreed-upon manner for the 
collective benefit of more than one nation. Because of this continuity, historical differences in 
the scope of treaties do not frustrate modern application of their guiding principles. 
118. See Golove, supra note 2, at 1134; see also Hathaway et al., supra note 2, at 245-48 (discussing 
the Framers’ design of the treaty power). 
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individual states in treaty-making—or allowing state laws to contradict national 
treaty commitments—could expose the United States to a heightened risk of le-
gal attack by other nations, as well as commercial and diplomatic embarrass-
ment. To protect state and individual rights, the Framers strictly delineated the 
domain of the federal government, granting it plenary authority over foreign af-
fairs and the power to conclude international agreements. As the Framers’ public 
statements and private writings demonstrate, they conceived of a treaty power 
that was strong enough to compel national compliance with the United States’ 
international legal commitments. However, the Framers’ interest in protecting 
states’ rights and their establishment of clear structural bounds for the treaty 
power imply that this authority was never meant to extend indefinitely. 
Because the Court declined to resolve the constitutional issue in Bond, ques-
tions surrounding the proper scope of the treaty power are likely to continue to 
vex litigants and courts,
119
 as well as treaty negotiators and Congress. Although 
the legal obligations attached to treaties and the scope of modern international 
commitments have changed, the abiding principles that drove the Framers 
should continue to ground our interpretation of the treaty power today. Recog-
nizing the careful balance that the Framers sought between these competing sets 
of concerns, this Comment finds the scope of the treaty power to be strong 
enough to bind the whole nation to its international commitments, but strictly 
limited by structural bounds so as to preserve the rights of states in our federal 
system of government. 
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